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Abstract: This paper examines the ways in which colonial violence is transformed and
spatialised into negotiated precarities at the occupied Palestine. The notion of “negoti-
ated precarity” is developed herein, to refer to two aspects in particular. First, to spatial
compartmentalisation, which shows how the settler colonial power operates by creating
precarious administrative zones, where the life of the colonised becomes prone to sev-
eral ﬂexible, negotiated uses of power. Second, negotiated precarity is used to refer to
the conduct of the colonised that counters, transforms, redirects, cancels or hampers
the colonial spatialisations of power. By focusing on the “negotiated precarities” in a
singular West Bank village, I exemplify how the colonial governing is entwined with spa-
tial compartments that enable several informal, indirect and ad hoc techniques of colo-
nial violence, but also how the colonial governing is constantly mobilised, negotiated,
countered and redirected in/through the everyday Palestinian spaces.
Keywords: Palestine, West Bank, compartmentalisation, zoning, precarity, settler
colonialism, government, political action
It is conﬂict about the history, and the geography of the land ... when they change
the geography, they change the history. (Interviewee, Al-Walaja, West Bank)
Introduction
As Frantz Fanon (1963:29) wrote in The Wretched of the Earth, “the colonial world
is a world divided into compartments”. During the last 50 years of Israeli occupa-
tion, administrative zonings, enclavisations, borderings, quarters, compartments,
lines, pockets, segregations and other divides have played a crucial role in produc-
ing the complex and historically layered spaces of governing the occupied Pales-
tinian territories, particularly the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Falah 2003;
Zureik 2016).1 Although these spatial divisions have often, and justly, been dis-
cussed in terms of racial separation, apartheid or broader organisation and
exploitation of life in the colonies (e.g. Kipfer 2006; Legg 2007; Pappe 2015;
Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2014; Veracini 2010; Yiftachel 2009), in this paper I approach
these compartmentalisations, not only as a technique for spatialising settler colo-
nial violence, but also as they are negotiated as part of the everyday Palestinian
spaces. Compartmentalisation, I show, operates by creating precarious
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administrative zones, where the life of the colonised is prone to a variety of spa-
tially negotiated colonial precarities. I examine these zonings and precarities by
focusing on the variety of modes though which they are mobilised, negotiated,
redirected and implemented as part of the everyday Palestinian life. I will do so
by focusing on the West Bank village of Al-Walaja, which I show to provide an
exemplary site for examining not only the variety of techniques Israel uses to spa-
tialise its settler colonial project, but the ways in which these precarities become
implemented, negotiated and redirected in practice. A more profound picture of
the occupation is thus revealed, one that shows how colonial violence induces
vulnerabilities (precarisation) upon the occupied population and the spaces they
dwell in, but also how the establishment of precarious zones (compartmentalisa-
tion) enables several formal and informal, direct and indirect practices that link
administrative violence back to the military violence of killing, harming, destruct-
ing, disabling and maiming. My main claim is that a focus on what I refer to as
the “negotiated precarities” affords a stance that properly acknowledges not only
how the use of power and distribution of precarities are negotiated in the spatiali-
sation of colonial power, but also the ways in which the practices of governing
appear and become redirected, ignored, erased, transformed, etc. as part of the
everyday spaces of the colonised.
I start the paper by discussing the main processes at play in “negotiated precar-
ities”: the ﬂexible precarisation part of compartmentalising colonial power and the
negotiation of precarities in everyday Palestinian spaces. I focus in particular on
how precarity operates as a political and ontological condition of governing and
counter-conduct, and how these different sides of precarity are played out in spa-
tial terms. In the second section I look at the historical ways in which colonial pre-
carities have been spatialised in the village of Al-Walaja. In the third section I
show how this compartmentalisation has enabled the state of Israel to ﬂexibly
control, strangulate and disable the sites of everyday Palestinian life. In order to
further scrutinise how such ﬂexible governing functions, I show how a cavalcade
of formal and informal governing practices bring the colonial violence to the fore
through a precarisation that is negotiated and manifested as part of the everyday
life of Palestinian bodies and their sites of dwelling.
Studying Colonial Violence in Spaces of Everyday
Spatialising colonial violence through administrative, legal and governmental pro-
cesses is, of course, not a new phenomenon. As Achille Mbembe (2003:26)
recalls, colonial powers have for a long time (re)shaped power relations in colo-
nies by establishing administrative zones, enclaves and borders, often accompa-
nied by new social hierarchies and land ownership arrangements (see Legg 2007;
Shaﬁr 1989). The ongoing legalisation of land appropriations (Joronen 2017b),
the use of permit regimes (Berda 2017), and the demolition of homes often
related to colonial planning and rezoning (Chiodelli 2012, 2017) are all, as I will
show below in detail, clearly indicative of how Israel uses administrative processes
for spatialising settler colonial violence, particularly in the West Bank and East Jer-
usalem. While there is a broader agreement within the existing literature on the
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prevalence of Israel’s use of settler colonial means of governing (Pullan and Yacobi
2017; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2014, 2015; Veracini 2006, 2010; Zureik 2016), critics
have claimed all too often Palestinian spaces have been framed through, and so
sidelined with those of the Israeli occupation (Allen 2008; Harker 2009; Joronen
2017a; Kotef and Amir 2011; Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2008). As it has also been
argued within the literature critical of governing- and governmentality-centred
approaches (Death 2010; MacKinnon 2000), focus on the control, government,
and conducting of others tends to ignore the “real-world messiness”, therefore
setting aside “the practice, implementation, agency, experience and resistance”
of the ones governed (Rosol 2014:75). Mbembe (2003:28–29), for instance,
acknowledges Palestine as one of the “most accomplished sites” of “late colonial
power”, claiming it offers a principal set, where the multiple forms of power—
from the disciplinary to bio- and necro-political (see Joronen 2016a; Zureik 2016)
—are used to extend Israel’s “absolute domination over the inhabitants of the
occupied territories” (emphasis added). And yet, the focus on domination and
control, and the colonial spaces they induce (Gordon 2008; Weizman 2007), can
never capture the everyday spaces of Palestinian life, always irreducible to the aims
and functions of the (settler) colonial state (e.g. Amir and Kotef 2015; Grifﬁths
2017; Harker 2009; Joronen 2017a).
In this article I suggest one way for properly acknowledging the above-men-
tioned approaches—the ones focusing on the colonial spaces induced through
the Israeli governing practices (e.g. Gordon 2008; Weizman 2007), and the
others focusing on Palestinian spaces of everyday (e.g. Harker 2009; Joronen
2017a)—is through the notion of precarity. Focus on precarity, particularly on its
“spatialisation”, I argue, helps in showing how Israeli settler colonialism operates
through the spatial zones and compartments that use precarisation as a tool for
governing, while also revealing how governing becomes implemented through
the spaces of everyday encounter, or what I refer to as the “negotiated precari-
ties” redirecting, ignoring, erasing and transforming the colonial conduct.
My argument here is twofold. First, although the precarisation of the colonised
can be used as a settler colonial tactic of governing, precariousness is also some-
thing, as Judith Butler (2010:25–26) writes, that characterises “life itself”, and
thus, I argue, all efforts to govern. The notion of precariousness hence signiﬁ-
cantly broadens the scope of precarity from current approaches that either con-
sider it as an “affectual” condition (Anderson 2014:126–127) or as a “political”
form of governing (Lorey 2015) to cover the ontological fragility intrinsic for all
living and acting, including the practices of governing. This signiﬁes not only the
fact that governing remains always vulnerable to resistance, but also the uncer-
tainty, unpredictability and incompleteness of governing, which we can see in
negotiations taking place in spatialising the use of colonial power. Second, even
though precarisation has the power to turn the spaces and lives of the colonised
even close to unliveable, it can also operate as a source of action. Induced precar-
ities do not merely passivise those set under the precarious conditions, but engen-
der new forms of action and social practice, ranging from the solidarity within the
communities under the threat of settler colonial eviction to the counter-conducts
and counter-visibilities against the settler colonial ways of precarisation and
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elimination (see Athanasiou 2016; Hammami 2016; Joronen 2017a; Joronen and
Grifﬁths 2018a). Together, these two tensions—the one between the political dis-
tribution of precarities and ontological precariousness, and the other between
precarity as a source of governing and counter-conduct—also help in understand-
ing how the corresponding spatialities between the compartmentalisation (as a
tactic of spatialising colonial violence) and the negotiated precarities operate in a
way that takes into account the irreducibility of Palestinian spaces to the precari-
ties imposed by Israeli settler colonialism.
Judith Butler’s discussion of precarity as differentiated between the ontological
and the political condition—between life’s intrinsic frailty, ﬁnitude, and proneness
to harm (its precariousness) and the political frames and social conditions through
which precarities become distributed—has been of inﬂuence for recent geographi-
cal work on Palestine and beyond (e.g. Grifﬁths and Joronen 2018; Harker 2012;
Joronen 2016b; Kearns 2013). These debates examine and draw attention to the
manifold political ways through which precarity has been used as a tool for gov-
erning, from neoliberal to settler colonial (Waite 2009), leaving the role of the on-
tological precariousness in governing relatively untouched. Apart from Mitch
Rose’s (2014:215) elaboration of the way in which ontological vulnerability has
been mobilised as a form of “negative governance”, where the precariousness of
life itself is “let to rule” through the “strategic decision not to govern” (see also
Joronen 2017b; Ramadan and Fregonese 2017), the ways in which ontological
precariousness constitutes and relates to a practice of governing have not been
taken into explicit consideration.
To properly consider the role of precariousness in governing, I argue, ﬁrst, that
while we need to acknowledge that the governed may be placed in vulnerable liv-
ing conditions, governmental processes themselves also bear ontological vulnera-
bilities that make governing a conduct always prone to failure, reconﬁguration,
transformation, resistance and other unpredictable outcomes. I hence understand
governing practice as an aim to govern—as a governmentalising drive in which vul-
nerability, complicity, incompleteness, and metamorphosis may become visible
through analysis of its implementation and negotiation in everyday spaces.
Nonetheless, even though precariousness may constitute an ontological condition
of living, it always remains irreducible to any of the particular political, social and
spatial ontologies—it constitutes, as Butler (2015:129) aptly writes, our “joint
non-foundation”. Precariousness is thus what haunts all political, social and spatial
manifestations as a reminder of their intrinsic ﬁnitude, thereby offering, not an
ontological foundation of life, but a condition that makes life (and its governing)
fragile, vulnerable and ﬁnite. It is such a “hauntology” of precariousness that thus
makes colonial governing vulnerable, incomplete and prone to resistance and
negotiations.
Second, the irreducibility of precariousness to any political means also allows it
to operate as a source for both, governing (precarisation) and the counter-con-
duct (mobilisation of the precarised). This, I argue, highlights the importance of
comprehending precarity as beyond the passivising/activating and the governing/
governed divides (see also Athanasiou 2016; Butler 2016). As shown by several
scholars, even remarkable vulnerabilities can create new forms of solidarity
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(Hammami 2016), steadfastness (Lentin 2016), resistance (Joronen 2017a), resili-
ent family practices (Harker 2012), affectual capacities (Joronen and Grifﬁths
2019a) and hope (Grifﬁths 2017; Joronen and Grifﬁths 2019b) among the colo-
nised, particularly when shared. Vulnerability can be hence used to perpetuate
subjugating governing but also activating resistance; it ensures the governed and
the governing alike remain vulnerable, but can also be used as a resource for
afﬁrming new action, counter-conduct and new ways of coping with settler colo-
nial violence. Focus on the means of governing, no matter how persuasive they
are, is not enough; attention must be paid to the processes of distribution in the
actual “messiness” of governing practice and how precarities are negotiated,
resisted and transformed in and through everyday encounters. Accordingly, one
should recognise the incompleteness and incapacity of governing, but also the
hope, counter-acting, pertinacity, obduracy, disobedience, solidarity, resistance
and the other manifold, often small-scale ways of erasing, diminishing, redirect-
ing, cancelling, ignoring and inoperationalising the precarities induced by settler
colonial governing.
The focus on the negotiation, distribution and alleviation of precarities means,
above all, attending to how precarities become spatialised and distributed in
space. As Christopher Harker (2012) has shown, examining precarity through dif-
ferent spatio-temporal contexts helps in revealing more nuanced and spatially dif-
ferentiated politics, which unsettles the spatially robust divides often associated
with discussions of war, colonialism and nationalism. For Harker, this speciﬁc focus
has enabled compelling accounts of how Palestinian family practices help in allevi-
ating exposure to colonial precarities in spatially differentiated and localised ways.
In the analysis that follows, I draw on and further Harker’s insight to show how
the spatial differentiation of precarities emerge through the two connected pro-
cesses: the “compartmentalisation” of precarities into administrative zones; and
the negotiation of precarities as part of the spaces of implementation, of which I
mean not only those negotiations Palestinians do in their daily lives but the ones
related to the space-sensitive use of power. To this end, I suggest starting from
the everyday struggles and violence faced by the colonised can provide an ethi-
cally motivated methodological stance that makes the everyday realities of the
colonised its prime concern. As claimed by several authors, it is an ethical stand-
point to look at Palestinian lives beyond the “victimhood”, which at worst
reduces them into mere targets of governing without a voice of their own (e.g.
Kotef and Amir 2011; Marshall 2014). The erasure of Palestinian agency, voice
and capacity to resist is particularly problematic as Palestinians themselves refuse
to succumb, both in practice (Joronen 2017a) and at the level of identiﬁcation
(Lentin 2016), into mere targets of colonial power. And yet, as I will further show
in the ﬁnal section, focus on negotiated precarities also shows the controversial
and countering nature of governing, as practices of resistance and counter-con-
duct can also be re-mobilised to serve the purpose of governing. Not only are
governmental efforts thus prone to resisting and counter-conduct, but the resis-
tance and counter-conduct themselves can also be tactically promoted
to strengthen and normalise colonial conduct. This dynamic, I argue, further
underlines the need to focus on the spatialisation of precarity, particularly on how
842 Antipode
ª 2019 The Author. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
the practice of governing appears and becomes negotiated as part of the every-
day life of colonised people.
As the discussion above shows, amplifying the voice of (rather than giving a
voice to) colonised people is an ethical and methodological task that engages
with the “actual messiness” and the (often informal) complexity of governing and
colonial violence. The accounts I use here to explore the negotiated precarities
are drawn from the two ﬁeldwork periods conducted in the West Bank village of
Al-Walaja and its surroundings in 2016 and 2017, during which I interviewed resi-
dents including farmers, ofﬁcials, council members, activists, NGO workers, pen-
sioners and families dealing with and/or threatened by different forms of colonial
violence. Some of the talks were conducted in a more formal interview set-up (16
interviews), others more informally by participating in the olive harvest, council
meetings and other social get-togethers, or as walking interviews around the vil-
lage and its surroundings. The interview materials were supported by daily obser-
vations, notes and ethnographic vignettes put together into ﬁeldwork diaries, but
also by other ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial materials collected from different archival
sources (i.e. home demolition orders, statistics, Al-Walaja Facebook pages).
Through these materials, I show, we can paint a subtler picture on the spatialisa-
tion of precarities—on how the establishment of precarious zones makes colonial
tactics part of everyday Palestinian life (compartmentalisation), and how informal
practices and everyday spaces of encounter are crucial for the precarisation and
their implementation as negotiated precarities.
Compartmentalisation of Al-Walaja: Short History of
Governmental Zonings
As Ghazi-Walid Falah (2003) has shown, targeting of the Arab-Palestinian popula-
tion in the occupied territories and Israel proper through “zoning”, “enclaviza-
tion/exclavization” and “spatial segregation” policies has a long history that can
be dated to before the 1967 occupation of the Palestinian Territories (on the role
of the British Mandate regulations, see Abdo 2011; Gordon 2008). While Falah’s
focus on zoning reveals the colonial processes that effect the overall “shrinking”
of Palestinian land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the creation of zones, I
argue, also allows Israel to ﬂexibly implement colonial processes through several
informal and indirect site-speciﬁc practices. This is particularly the case in Al-
Walaja (and its surroundings, Al-Makhrour, Battir, Cremisan Valley), one of the
“border” sites next to the 1949 armistice line (the “green line”) in the eastern
part of the Bethlehem district. Al-Walaja’s vicinity to Jerusalem has made it subject
to several colonial spatialisations, including the Jerusalem Masterplan, construction
of the Separation Wall, settlement expansion, national park establishment, and
the cavalcade of Israeli “Area C” policies. It is precisely these processes, originating
in different historical moments, that have created a presence of several adminis-
trative compartments which the state of Israel uses to ﬂexibly implement settler
colonial appropriations, eliminations and evictions.
After the 1948 war, approximately 66% of Al-Walaja’s original land area, includ-
ing the build-up part of the village, was handed to the newly established state of
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Israel in the armistice agreement signed with Jordan in April 1949 (Khalidi
1997:322–323). Many Al-Walajees ﬂed the 1948 battles to the caves in the east-
ern agricultural part of village—one of the older interviewees even bravely stating
he was “born in a cave”—to wait for a chance to return to their homes. After
Israel destroyed most of the original village in 1954 to prevent Al-Walajees, contra
UN resolution 194 (the “right to return’), from returning to their homes behind
the Green Line, villagers slowly started to realise their stalled situation. As one of
the villagers, born in the aftermath of the Nakba (the 1948 “catastrophe”), aptly
put it: “I was born as a refugee in my own village”. The temporary shanties,
shacks, cottages, and premises built in caves were gradually replaced with more
permanent houses, the eastern part of the village eventually forming what today
is known as the West Bank village of Al-Walaja (see Figure 1).
After Israel occupied the West Bank and other Palestinian territories after the
Six-Day War in 1967, Al-Walaja faced another kind of divide: the one of adminis-
trative zoning. More than a half of the remaining eastern part of the village (13%
of the original land area) was unilaterally annexed within the borders of Jerusalem,
which Israel today considers, again unilaterally and against the international law
or the view of an international community (excluding the Trump administration),
as its “united capital” (B’tselem 2014; UNRWA 2011). After the occupation, two
Figure 1: Compartmentalisation of Al-Walaja
(map by Issa Zboun, Head of Geo-Informatics [GIS & Remote Sensing]
Department, Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem [ARIJ], Bethlehem, Palestine;
modiﬁed by author; reproduced here with permission) [Colour ﬁgure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com].
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additional parcels of land were conﬁscated from the eastern part of the village for
the construction of Israeli-Jewish settlements—Gilo (1971) and Har Gilo (1972)—
both of which have had a steady population growth since their establishment
(ARIJ 2010:17; ECF 2016; JPS 2016). The rest of the village was occupied and held
under military rule (see Figure 1).
The re-zoning of the Jerusalem district, which also impinged on several other
West Bank communities around East Jerusalem (see Chiodelli 2017; Jabareen
2010; Yiftachel 2009), had a signiﬁcant impact on Al-Walaja, particularly after
Israel formalised Jerusalem as its united capital in 1980. Although much has been
written about the colonial aims and “creeping urban apartheid” of the Israeli
planning system (Yiftachel 2009), and the complex entanglement of racist goals
to rational-comprehensive and neoliberal planning in East Jerusalem (Abdo 2011;
Braier 2013; Wari 2011), Al-Walaja offers one of the sites for looking at the devas-
tating consequences these plans, particularly the “Jerusalem 2000 plan”,2 have
had for the surrounding West Bank communities. Despite being forcefully
annexed to Jerusalem, residents of the Jerusalem part of Al-Walaja (the Ain Jawai-
zeh neighbourhood) have not been offered Israeli citizenship or Jerusalem IDs (a
residency permit with limited rights issued to Palestinians in East Jerusalem; see
Tawil-Souri 2012). Although several legal efforts to recognise and improve the sta-
tus of Al-Walajees residing in Ain Jawaizeh have been made in Israeli courts, most
of the residents are still considered to dwell in their homes illegally, and have thus
been targeted with home demolition orders, harassments and administrative
ﬁnes. As the head of the village council estimated in 2017, since the mid 1980s
Israel has issued altogether 150 home demolition orders in Al-Walaja, while close
to 60 demolitions have already been implemented, some of the premises being
destroyed only recently (see also Al-Walaja Withstand 2018; BADIL 2013; UNRWA
2013).
Home demolitions, however, are not only restricted to land annexed to the Jer-
usalem district. After the Oslo Peace Accords (1993/1995), which were to offer a
roadmap to peace through the partial sovereignty of the newly established Pales-
tinian Authority (PA), the remaining part of Al-Walaja was zoned into areas “C”
and “B”. While “Area B” has a civilian administration run by the PA, it only com-
prises less than 3% of the original land area of the village (ARIJ 2010:16). The rest
of the post-67 village is considered as “Area C” under the direct security and
administrative control of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) (see Figure 1). Since the mid
1990s, however, Israel has used its control of Area C to further catalyse settlement
expansion, by simultaneously hampering Palestinian development with restrictions
and a purposely slow and obstructive permit regime (Berda 2017; Joronen
2017b). Less than 1% of the whole of “Area C” is allocated for Palestinian devel-
opment (OCHA 2014), while the situation is even more alarming in those parts of
“Area C”, such as Al-Walaja (of which the villagers used an expression “Area C
minus”) that stand in the way of the Israeli expansion plans. In the future trans-
portation plan for metropolitan Jerusalem, for instance (a collaborative effort
between Transportation Ministry, Finance Ministry, and Jerusalem Municipality),
the connection between West Bank settlements and Jerusalem is considered as a
natural part of metropolitan growth (JTM 2014).
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The most recent, still partly ongoing compartmentalisation is related to the
construction of the Separation Wall, the 8-metre concrete wall/fence which sepa-
rates the built-up areas of Al-Walaja from the surrounding agricultural lands in
both the Area C and “Jerusalem” parts (Ain Jamaizeh) (see Figure 1). As the con-
struction of the wall in Al-Walaja highlights, most of its planned route does not
run along the Green Line but within the West Bank, the wall thus connecting set-
tlements more tightly to Israel, while simultaneously sequestering land and
destroying the livelihoods of Palestinian villages, neighbourhoods and communi-
ties (UNRWA 2013). In Al-Walaja (and its surroundings) the wall has already sepa-
rated Palestinian farmers from their lands and obstructed olive harvesting and
grazing in the “seam zone” between the Wall and the Green line; it has also
imposed a signiﬁcant threat of demolition upon homes located behind or in the
planned route of the wall. One of the farmer families, for instance, explained how
they now need to “buy feed for their goats” who, before the Wall, would graze
in the areas now separated away. When complete, the wall will entirely surround
Al-Walaja and strangulate it to a “Bantustan” with one entrance point only.
As the discussion above shows, Al-Walaja has not only been cut into several
governmental zones and compartments—Areas C and B, Jerusalem municipality,
settlements, seam zones—but strangulated and shrunk into an isolated pocket tar-
geted by different regulations, permits and administrative conducts related to
home demolitions, land appropriations, restrictions and other ways of hampering
everyday life and the practice of professions. Together the historically folded
agreements, conﬁscations, zonings, strangulations and unilateral annexations have
thus created a local mosaic of governmental compartments, which offers a spatial
platform for ﬂexibly spatialising colonial violence through the variety of adminis-
trative techniques, practices, plans and regulations, whose speciﬁcities I turn to in
the following section.
Negotiating Precarity
As the head of the Al-Walaja village council summarised, compartmentalisation of
the village has affected everyday life in profound ways. “Many people here were
farmers”, he explained; “now, after the land was taken from them, people are
going to other jobs”. As another interviewee continued, conﬁscation of areas with
water springs in particular has signiﬁcantly affected the livelihood of the village:
Al-Walaja was one of the main villages in the area that provided fruits and vegetables
for Jerusalem, and the whole region. Now, since we don’t have the water, we cannot
farm anymore, the land is becoming drier and the farmers turning into workers.
One of the few remaining water springs, Al-Haniye, that emerges from the
caves in the western part of the village, is located in a section of a “seam zone”,
which Israel designated a public park area in 2013 (B’tselem 2014). As the newly
established information boards around the spring show, Israel is currently turning
the area into a public park with cycling paths, hiking trails, picnic areas, play
grounds, planted forest areas, artiﬁcial lakes, archaeological sites, and so forth.
The Al-Haniye spring, which used to be a popular picnic site for the Al-Walajees,
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has thus become almost unrecognisable for villagers during the last year, particu-
larly due to the archaeological reconstructions around the spring. Archaeology, as
acknowledged by a number of scholars, has been one of the ways through which
Israel appropriates and builds ethnic belongingness to the occupied lands, some-
times with dubious interpretations, or by simply excluding non-Jewish archaeolog-
ical layers (Gori 2013; Makdisi 2010). Despite the fact that the park area was re-
zoned as a “public space” within the West Bank territory, Palestinian access to
Al-Haniye is restricted by a fence and a checkpoint that was recently moved
between the village and the spring (Hasson 2017). “They either take the land for
the public use, settler roads usually, build parks, or conﬁscate land for military
areas”, one of the interviewees described the common ways of conﬁscating land
(see also OCHA 2009; POICA 2016). As another interviewee from Al-Walaja aptly
stated, “they want to have a picnic in our land, while we are prisoners sur-
rounded by walls”.
Re-zoning West Bank areas between the Green Line and the Wall, however, is
not only about conﬁscating Palestinian land and water resources; it also affects
everyday life in manifold, less direct ways, as was evident during the olive harvest
in Autumn 2017. In October of that year, when I arrived at the ﬁelds in the valley
below Al-Walaja, families were gathering to share a meal and I was invited to join
the picnic served with fresh olive oil, zaatar and shraak-bread freshly made in the
campﬁre. Kids were playing, and climbing the trees, endlessly poking us to take
(and show) photos of them playing, smiling and fooling around. Afterwards, we
went downwards to check one of the few springs still accessible to villagers.
Music reached us from somewhere far away, suddenly becoming louder, again
quieting down, as though it was coming from a car passing by with windows
down and music playing far too loud. We walked downwards, the music contin-
ued vibrating and echoing around the valley. There was something strange in the
music—in its ridiculously pumping techno-beat and overtly aggressive vocals—
that at intervals caught our attention, only to soon disappear to the background.
We arrived at the spring and sat down on the edge of the concrete pool, kids
threw rocks in the water, when suddenly the music became very loud, accompa-
nied by an aggressive choir of screams. I realised the voices were multiple and
came downwards, from the Al-Haniye area. “It is settler music”, someone blurted
to me; “settlers are down there”. For a scene, that was clearly meant to be a dis-
turbance, a deterrent, or at least a reminder of the presence of the threat of set-
tler violence, the impact on villagers and olive pickers seemed almost null. Kids
were not asked to run to their parents, warnings were not given, there were no
signs of fear in the air. “We need to be strong”, one interviewee said later on, “to
not let these things to get under our skin”. Yet, the presence of settlers, and the
colonial appropriation, gave an atmospheric reminder, marking the site villagers
had enjoyed just recently with aggression and noise, thus reiterating the villagers’
sense the park area is not theirs anymore.
A similar story came out in an interview I conducted in 2017 with an old man
named Ahmed.3 Ahmed, born and raised in Al-Walaja, told his life-story focused
on his struggle against Israeli land appropriations—of disobedience, of IDF soldiers
dragging him off his land now located behind the Wall, of his arrest and
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(unsuccessful) efforts to force false confessions out of him. During the interview,
those surrounding Ahmed—my research assistant, a local guide and Ahmed’s
grandson and me—listened to Ahmed’s story silently, occasionally laughing at his
(mis)adventures and stubborn resoluteness:
800 metres of the Wall is on my own land. They needed to cut the trees to make the
Wall and ... gave me an option to replace the uprooted trees to my land, but I said
“don’t touch anything”. Because then they would say they didn’t uproot the trees,
but just moved them! They said they will take the trees away then, but I told them,
“if you take the trees, I will break your hands”.
The old man, born in pre-48 Al-Walaja, was as resolute as someone who had ded-
icated his life to one thing—resisting occupation—could be, simultaneously shar-
ing his experience of the village history. Ahmed’s story might serve as an
exemplar of Palestinian sumud, the cultural steadfastness that is widely docu-
mented as a stance central to Palestinian resistance (e.g. Lentin 2016; Mason and
Dajani 2018). Recent events, however, made him to pause and lower his voice:
My father’s, mother’s, and grandmother’s tombs are on the other side of the Wall ...
and they decided to build a small tunnel for me to visit the graves. They said they will
put electric fence around the tombs, but I refused and said, “if you put it, I will take it
away”. They ended up making the tunnel for me, but said they will put gates on it.
The gates, which were eventually installed, do not merely prevent unobstructed
passage to the lands in the “seam zone”. As another interviewee, Fahed told us,
whose family’s olive trees fell behind the separation wall in the surrounding area,
four years had passed before mainly the eldest from each family were allowed to
pass through the gates to visit their lands again this year. “Last time all the olives
were stolen by settlers”, he said, “but this time hundreds of years old trees were
damaged and really dry, almost dying”.
As the stolen olives, damaged trees and settler music all indicate, the wall does
not simply restrict mobility or ease conﬁscation; it also creates precarious zones
more susceptible to informal colonial conduct. Ahmed continued: “After they
uprooted the trees, I planted hundreds of new ones, but a ﬁre burned a lot of
those trees ... They were working on my land to build the wall, and set a ﬁre,
which spread”. Similar “accidents” also took place for other villagers. Another
farmer, Omar, was much more straightforward when telling me about his
encounter with colonial violence: “When they build the wall here... they made
strong explosions near the house. They said they did it to open up a road, so that
the collapse of the house would look like it was demolished by accident”. Omar
continued:
When they saw the house was cracked, but not collapsed, they came back in Decem-
ber, and made four holes on the ground, so that the rainwater would ﬂow into them,
and pass under the tiling ... They tried to put the house into very bad condition and
in every possible way to make me leave.
As the accounts of Omar, Fahed, Ahmed and the olive picking exemplify, set-
tler colonial conduct is very much in negotiation through ﬂexible context-driven
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(re)-actions, affectual countering, transformations and informal mobilisations. In
terms of governing, the cases show how precarious compartments enable a ﬂexi-
ble use of several formal and informal, direct and indirect, even contrary tactics
of colonial precarisation. It is curious that, while the zones were precarising for
Al-Walajees, they were simultaneously used to implement improving practices
that aimed to make “the wasteland bloom” the colonial narratives of history and
space—from archaeological reconstructions and parks to security fences and
gates (e.g. Yiftachel 2002). Such tactics, as Elizabeth Povinelli (2016:16, 173–
174) holds, aim to denude life, not merely to dispose it, but to make it hos-
pitable to improvements. Accordingly, several informal practices were used to
evict Omar, to make him leave by his own will, while simultaneously several
development plans for opening up a new luxury hotel next to Omar’s piece of
land, for instance, were presented (see Jerusalem 5800 2016:8, 57). Similarly,
the uprooting of Ahmed’s olive trees and the denial of access to his ﬁelds were
done to increase security—to protect valuable life from the harm of the colonised
population. The park, with its artiﬁcial lakes and archaeological reconstructions,
required that the life of the colonised was ﬁrst liquidated into a reproducible
space. Such improvements arguably present a colonial biopolitics that erases life,
and modiﬁes the rock, to make the sites of dwelling dead, reborn and bloom the
settler narratives. As such, these techniques used the vulnerability and fragility of
life to fuel their “improving” metamorphoses, embedding biopolitical tactics in
the manifold ways of installing precarities via compartments. And yet, as the
manifoldness in governing practice indicates, such distribution of precarity is not
merely marrying erasure with improvement, but shows how precarities can be
induced by ﬂexibly connecting the settler colonial claims of sovereignty to biopo-
litical practices that “remove to establish a better policy” and an “ideal social
body” (Veracini 2010:4).
The aspect of negotiation continued to come forth in ways in which settler
colonial precarisation was implemented, not only through the tactics of “erasing
improvements”, but through the informal ways of bodily violence and harming.
This was particularly the case with Omar, who in 2010 was informed that his fam-
ily’s house was to be completely cut off from the rest of the village by the Wall.
As if that was not enough, in 2011 Omar’s family was informed that an additional
electric fence would be built around their house, while a separate door, later to
be replaced by a tunnel under the wall, would be installed for the family. As
Omar put it, by sardonically referring to a Zionist terra nullus—proverb, “they
were seeking a land without a people, but were annoyed by the fact that some-
one was already living here”.4 Several other options were given to Omar and his
family: to sell the house; to rent it on a 99-year lease; to become a partner and
share the proﬁts on his land; to accept a Jerusalem ID and/or a new piece of land.
Omar refused all the options for several reasons, not least because of what he
would lose in exchange for an ID that would not grant him a full citizenship and
could be taken away from him on spurious grounds,5 but also as the village
would lose yet another piece of land. That’s when, Omar recalls, “the violence
against my family began”:
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They told me they were going to teach me “a different way”. Once soldiers hit my
son with the back of the gun ... 14 stitches were needed. My wife was pregnant and
they used violence against her too ... I was harassed and arrested about ten times.
The last time Omar was arrested, he was hit so hard he was in the prison hospi-
tal for two months, a fact which, Omar found out later, was not ofﬁcially
recorded in any way. Omar’s family’s case presents an example of how the com-
partmentalisation of colonial violence into precarious zones enables a use of other,
complementary forms of violence that are masked under de-politicised administra-
tive orders and development plans while simultaneously brought to the level of
the body and the everyday. But most notably, Omar’s case shows, together with
several others such as the one of Ahmed, how the bureaucratic and administrative
violence is linked back to the military violence of bodily harm, always negotiated
and ﬂexibly implemented as part of the actual governing practice (for further
examples, see Al-Walaja Withstand 2018).
In the beginning of 2016, after Omar’s case had received signiﬁcant media
attention and several delegates from different consulates, even Palestinian minis-
ters, visited his place, Omar’s family decided to push the case to the “highest
court level possible”. Omar explained how the court case was framed as neutrally
as possible: “the case was about three kids, and their mother, wanting to live a
normal life, away from the violence”. “We are farmers, who have sheep”, he con-
tinued; “farmers, who are not allowed to live peacefully in their own land”. Soon
after the new court case was initiated, Israeli government representatives con-
tacted Omar—this time they wanted to negotiate peacefully.
Dozens of Israeli ofﬁcials came here to check everything we wrote about the legal case
was right. They went around, looked at my land, did a tour around the house, saw the
olive trees, the sheep and the well, pretending they didn’t already know everything.
The visitors were willing to negotiate with Omar on how his family could live a
normal life. “Normal”, for the Israeli administration, was a paper that listed 40
rules for Omar’s family. Omar presented his own requirements and after an eight-
month-long exchange the list was shortened to 16 rules. These security rules
ranked from the ones declaring “no clashes with settlers were allowed” to the
ones that ruled, for instance, that each visitor of the family had to give their name
and ID to IDF hours before visiting, they could not stay later than 12 am, and
should leave their car in front of the gate of a tunnel that connected Omar’s
house to the village.
Although the encounters discussed above show how the spatialisation of colo-
nial violence ﬂuctuates between physical and menacing, formal and informal,
antagonist and afﬁrmative, sovereign and biopolitical, planned and ad hoc prac-
tice, they also exemplify how the colonial power becomes resisted, redirected,
shaped and negotiated in everyday encounters. As Omar’s and Ahmed’s accounts
show, increasing precarities did not passivise but fuelled new actions and counter-
conducts, at times limiting, cancelling and redirecting the colonial practices, fur-
ther underlining the incompleteness and transformative nature of governing. And
yet, such “negotiated precarities” can always push in opposite directions: they
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can turn administrative orders to military violence, but also vice versa. Unlike
Omar, who was able to keep his home (though with high costs), the fate of the
many in Al-Walaja has been the cruel reality of house demolitions. About half of
the residents in the Jerusalem part of Al-Walaja (Ain Jawaizeh) now have demoli-
tion orders for their houses (FAW 2017). While some house demolitions are
related to the construction of the Separation Wall, most of the cases are epiphe-
nomenal to Israel’s strict permission policies in the East Jerusalem and the West
Bank Area C. The establishment of ambiguous, zone-speciﬁc permit regimes
(Berda 2017)—another way of spatialising precarisation—has in particular forced
Palestinian residents to build on their own lands without permits (e.g. Wari
2011). “This is an area of high point of interest”, one of the village council mem-
bers of Al-Walaja held; “they might disappear for a year but always come back,
because they don’t want any expansion here”, further explaining how after the
recently added part of the Wall was ﬁnished (May 2017), eight houses were
demolished, while orders to cease construction were also given to several other
villagers (see also Ma’an 2017).
Demolitions, however, consist of more than turning houses into “piles of rubble”.
As Harker (2009:324–326) reminds us, house demolitions should be considered as a
way of targeting all those “economic, social and cultural” connections that consti-
tute one’s home. In Al-Walaja, for instance, villagers had often taken loans to build
or extend their houses, while it is not uncommon to ﬁnd Palestinians destroying
their own homes under the threat of ﬁnes and imprisonment (see Wari 2011:468–
469). Constant night raids and a concrete wall behind the living room window also
effect demolition of homes by “killing us slowly without a war”, as one interviewee
held. Life under the pending demolition orders, with all the necessary items “packed
into bags” (in case Israeli soldiers enter unexpectedly), alone causes “constant fear
and anxiety about the future”, as another interviewee from Al-Walaja said. In some
cases, a “mere note had been left at night”, the residents being unaware of the
demolition until the bulldozers arrived in the morning. As Shalhoub-Kevorkian
(2015:102) has suggested, fear of losing a home can alone become a signiﬁcant fac-
tor that hampers and destroys daily life, posing what she refers to as the “demolition
before the demolition”. Here time, waiting and prolonging become crucial elements
of governing. The limbo does not merely ensure the precarious situation, with all
the fears and anxieties, prevails among the colonised, but constitutes an entire sys-
tem of “effective inefﬁciency”, where the slowness and tardiness in administrative
processes is used to induce further precarities (see Berda 2017; Joronen 2017b). As
a ﬁeld researcher of a Bethlehem-based NGO described, many Palestinians in the
region do apply for building permits before construction, but face the precarities of
slow-motion governing: “houses can be there for six years before Israeli ofﬁcials start
to claim undue payments, with high rates of interest”—a situation that is economi-
cally unbearable for many.
The slow-motion governing is also evident in the way in which Al-Walajees liv-
ing in Ain Jawaizeh are constantly excluded from services and infrastructure. On
occasion, the residents of Ain Jawaizeh have been promised a change in their state
of affairs, on condition that they legalise their residency statuses by applying for
the Jerusalem ID. Despite the fact that Israel considers this part of the village to
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be under the Jerusalem district, only a few applications of the residents who lived
in the Jerusalem part of the village before 1967 were eventually approved. The
slow-motion governing is, this shows, not merely about passive waiting, but
about activation and negotiations:
They [Israeli authorities] asked us to form a different council, different from the one
under the Palestinian Authority. They wanted to split the village council and ... to
form a separate village called “Ain Jawaizeh” that they would then consider giving ser-
vices. We totally rejected this idea, since we don’t want to split Al-Walaja.
Instead of forming a separate village council, the council member underlined
the urgent need for a building plan, not only to (counter-)map Al-Walaja, but to
start improving the situation in Ain Jawaizeh. “We don’t want to build up a park
and put money on it, and see it demolished”, he said, referring to the hope that a
formally accepted village-wide building plan would prevent Israel from promoting
colonial violence through demolition orders and denial of permits. Indeed, coun-
ter-planning and expert knowledge are important tools for resisting dubious plans,
to which the recent study of Rosol (2014) in Vancouver also offers an insight.
Resistance against re-zoning policies, she shows, did not aim at mere “liberation
from an oppressor”, but took a form of “counter-conduct” that used expert
knowledge to demand different types of development (Rosol 2014:75). The role
of planning and expert knowledge in Al-Walaja, however, seems more complex,
particularly as different zones—Area C, Area B, seam zone, and the Jerusalem part
of the village—are run by different (but overlapping) regulations, permit systems
and logics (Berda 2017:38). This is shown in the way in which the above-men-
tioned village council member on the one hand underlined the need for a com-
prehensive town plan, while on the other hand fearing such plans might split the
village into separate administrative zones, the plan thus functioning to further
enforce and normalise the colonial compartmentalisation of the village. Although
“something needs to be done”, the council member aired, in order to improve
the precarious conditions in the village, administrative counter-knowledge would
further normalise the spatial divides in the village. As the council member con-
cluded, “it’s a sword with two edges—if we do it, it will stick us, if we don’t do it,
it will hit us anyway”.
Conclusion
As the paper has shown, permits, development plans, restrictions and conserva-
tion all exemplify how occupation is spatialised into compartments, where the
Palestinian life becomes exposed to manifold combinations of even contrary colo-
nial practices. Such zonings enable the state of Israel to ﬂexibly govern Palestinian
spaces, but also to reinforce vulnerabilities on the level of the body and the every-
day. Fieldwork in Al-Walaja showed how brutal violence and harassments have
become part of administrative governing, and how they are often accompanied
with vulnerabilities related to racial divides and accessibility, atmospheric intimida-
tions and estrangements, and security measures that work as a pretext for home
demolitions and the appropriation of land. Further, the formal act of
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compartmentalisation facilitates more informal acts—from intimidating settler
music, stolen olives and damaged trees to accidental ﬁres, explosions and ﬂoating
water—and indirect effects such as fearful and anxious waiting of home demoli-
tions. These dynamics of precarity are cumulatively central to an understanding of
how settler colonial violence is implemented, negotiated and transformed in Al-
Walaja.
In order to deal with this complexity, I have shown how taking the narratives
and practices of the colonised, particularly the ways in which Palestinians
encounter the indirect, informal and overlapping ramiﬁcations of governmental
processes in their daily lives, as a point of departure places research in the mid-
dle of the “actual messiness” of governing practice. I further suggested the
notion of “negotiated precarity” as capable of covering the political uses of pre-
carity as a ﬂexible tool of governing, but also the ways in which precarities
engender action, resistance and (social) ways of alleviating and transforming the
colonial violence. The focus on “negotiated precarities”, I have further shown,
affords a methodological and ethical stance ignoring the spatial imaginaries and
practices of the settler colonial regime (e.g. Veracini 2010), further acknowledg-
ing the cracks, incompleteness and transformations in the practice of governing.
Moreover, the notion of negotiation helps to acknowledge how counter-con-
duct, disobedience, pertinacity, hope, solidarity and other ways of erasing,
diminishing, redirecting and cancelling the effects of power are all part of the
“art of governing” (Legg 2018), often with unexpected ways, as the example of
counter-planning in Al-Walaja exempliﬁed. Yet, in all accounts the Al-Walajees
were activated rather than merely passivised and victimised by their precarious
situation, precarity thus standing between the activating and passivating, or
subjugating and afﬁrming condition. This signiﬁes not only the uncertainty and
unpredictability of how settler colonialism can be spatially practiced, but also
how existing Palestinian spaces affect, transform, redirect and reorganise aims
to spatialise precarity. Acknowledging such dynamics helps in recognising how
the political violence is entwined around everyday vulnerabilities and negotia-
tions of power that are often ignored in geopolitical narratives on Palestine/
Israel, but also in maintaining a sensitivity to politics and hope in sites, where
one hardly expects to ﬁnd any room left for their appearance (see Hage 2009;
Joronen and Grifﬁths 2019b). To understand such manifoldness in distributing
precarity, a more spatially grounded study of settler colonial power is needed,
as is a clearer articulation of the ways in which ontological precariousness
haunts all efforts to govern, act and resist. Precarity may be spatially and politi-
cally distributed as settler colonial conduct, but it is never reducible solely to
manifestations of power and desires to dominate.
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Endnotes
1 In Gaza the situation remains signiﬁcantly different, particularly due to Israel’s blockage
of the Gaza Strip after Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 (see Joronen 2016a).
2 According to Braier (2013), the “Jerusalem 2000” plan (also known as the “Jerusalem
Master Plan 2020”) has offered a guideline for the Jerusalem municipality and district plan-
ning since the end of 2008 (for more details, see Jabareen 2010; Wari 2011).
3 Names have been changed to protect the anonymity, unless the interviewee wanted to
appear with his/her own name. Interviewees are named only if they are quoted more than
once.
4 “Land without a people for a people without a land” (Said 1979:9). The origin, meaning
and the use of the proverb, however, are under dispute (e.g. Muir 2008), though the colo-
nial terra nullus-motif has clearly been an essential part of the Zionist narratives of “empty
land” (e.g. Yiftachel 2002:224–225), with “two millennia of neglect” now made into “agri-
cultural and botanic miracles” (Long 2009:65).
5 Since the Oslo Agreements, East Jerusalemites have been increasingly targeted with
deportations implemented through the “center of life” policy. The policy ties the renewal
of residency rights (“Jerusalem ID”) to the arbitrary requirement that Palestinians need to
meet in order to prove their centre of life is in Jerusalem, thus creating stateless persons
that exist, not outside the law, but within Israel’s citizenship legislation (see Jefferies 2012;
Tawil-Souri 2012).
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